Most bench scientists would find this question to be absurd. What could possibly be more fundamental to science than the presupposition of at least a necessary “methodological naturalism.” Pre-assuming that everything arises from physicodynamic causation alone has served science well, hasn’t it? But then, there’s the scores of nagging problems that arise from limiting investigation of a perceived reality to nothing more than Monod’s Chance and Necessity. Tension begins with the fact that the scientific method itself would be precluded if the philosophy of physicalistic naturalism were consistently maintained. Next, there’s nothing physical about numerical constants such as pi and the speed of light. All of the physical laws that govern physicodynamics are abstract formal mathematical concepts. The manipulation of these equations is altogether “teleological.” Logic theory loses all substance and reliability in a purely physicalistic epistemology. Our argument for physicalism betrays itself in its necessary use of nonphysical formalisms in trying to make its case. Consciousness, perception, language, and interpretation of results cannot be trusted within a purely physicodynamic ontology. Evolutionary biologists continue to bury their heads in sand regarding the choice-based controls needed for synthetic organic chemistry. Chance and Necessity don’t know what “function” is, and could care less. No rational justification exists for blindly believing that inanimate nature programmed prescriptive infogenesis using representational code. On-the-fly live DNA reprogramming to achieve rapid adaptation has now been documented in multiple species. An RNA stochastic ensemble doesn’t DO anything useful even if it spontaneously “emerged.” But its half-life is only four hours. Eons of time and purely metaphysical multiverses provide no mechanisms. No explanation is offered for the particular chiral-induced spin selectivity so critical to life. The list of inadequacies of physicalism goes on and on [1].